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to understand the Marcosian social fantasy and the sources of Filipino 
authoritarianism, which can illumine both the past and the present.
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I 
thank the conference organizers, Drs. Koki Seki and Itaru Nagasaka 
of Hiroshima University, for inviting me to give this keynote address. 
Offhand I must admit that I have nothing new to say, nothing you 
don’t already know. The list of papers and paper presenters that 
address the conference theme, “Three Decades of the Post-EDSA 
Philippines: Continuity, Discontinuity, and Emergence,” is impressive, and 
I have learned much from listening to the panels. What I hope to do is to 
share some reflections on scholarship on the Philippine state under the rule 
of Ferdinand Marcos. However, please allow me to begin by saying a few 
words about this historic city where this conference is being held.
Three Perspectives on the Atomic Bomb
No one ought to depart from here without having visited the Peace Memorial 
Museum and Park. As elements of public history, the surviving artifacts, 
photographs, and new multimedia technologies help us vividly imagine the 
horrors caused by the US decision to drop the atomic bomb here at 8:15 
in the morning of 6 August 1945. A compact settlement, Hiroshima had 
military installations that made it a target for a weapon of mass destruction, 
which at that time had just been invented. The team of the Manhattan 
Project made the bomb within twenty-seven months at the cost of US$2.2 
billion. The untold human suffering that the atomic bomb caused, especially 
on ordinary civilians, on noncombatants, can be seen in the museum, and 
no one can visit it without feeling horrified. The bomb instantly killed an 
estimated 80,000 civilians and military personnel and obliterated over half 
of Hiroshima. Many more would die later from the effects of the radiation 
fall out.
Notwithstanding the many heartrending stories, Hiroshima’s 
narrativization has not been simple and straightforward. Understandably, the 
Japanese side emphasizes “atomic victimization” and the pacifist movement 
that has arisen in response to the horrors of nuclear war. It is the narrative 
of the vanquished. Some argue that it occludes the bigger context of the 
war and Japan’s role in it, what Benedict Giamo (2003, 704) refers to as the 
“forbidden territory” in the Japanese nationalist discourse.
Expectedly, the view from the victor’s side has been very different. 
Across the Pacific, a dominant interpretation justifies the dropping of the 
bomb as a necessary evil in order to compel the Japanese to surrender. In 
other words, this view maintains that, had the bomb not been dropped, 
the Second World War would have dragged on and more atrocities would 
have been committed on the ground. Incidentally, the Boeing plane 
that carried a camera to photograph the atomic bomb’s explosion and its 
effects was later called Necessary Evil. In the West, this interpretation was 
virtually unquestioned during the first twenty years after the war. That the 
atomic bomb was a “necessary evil” was undisputed. Firm was the belief 
in its decisive role in bringing the Second World War to a close. In Ward 
Wilson’s (2007) schema, this represents the first of three periods of Western 
scholarship on Japan’s surrender.
“In 1965, however, a revisionist school began examining the decision to 
use the bomb more closely, raising moral questions about the use of nuclear 
weapons and asking probing questions about the motives of U.S. leaders. 
They continued to believe, however, that the bomb was instrumental in 
ending the war” (ibid., 162). In this perspective, the bombing was “evil,” but 
it was still deemed “necessary.” 
Since 1990, a third perspective has emerged from scholarship that has 
been aided by access to “recently declassified documents and extensive 
research into Japanese, Soviet, and U.S. archives” (ibid., 163). As a result, 
“New questions have been raised about the centrality of nuclear weapons in 
coercing Japan to end the war. In particular, analysis of the strategic situation 
from a Japanese perspective has led some scholars to assert that the Soviet 
Union’s entry into the Pacific war may have been as important or even more 
important in coercing Japan’s leaders” to surrender (ibid.). It is argued that 
there is no evidence for the conventional assertion that “the atomic bombing 
so shocked Japanese leaders that they agreed to unconditional surrender” 
(ibid., 173). Evidence suggests that the Japanese leaders did not consider 
the bombing decisive; neither did US leaders expect it to be so. “The bomb 
project staff [in the US] had set a schedule that called for ten bombs to be 
ready by the end of November [1945]” (ibid., 174). The position the third 
perspective asserts is simple: the bomb was evil and unnecessary.
For us specialists on the Philippines, specifically in connection with the 
Marcos state, a number of lessons from Hiroshima’s past can be gleaned. 
Rather obviously, discrepant historical interpretations arise depending on 
one’s positionality as either victor or vanquished. There are always two sides 
to a story. Moreover, interpretations of the past—although all seemingly 
guided by a moral standpoint—differ, and these interpretations change 
over time, making possible qualitatively different moral assertions. More 
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importantly, scholarly research and access to untapped sources are strategic 
in advancing new historical perspectives, as evinced in the third and latest 
approach to understanding the end of the war. Truth matters. Amid the 
contentiousness of the past, scholars have a distinct role to play in finding 
evidence and weaving them into a convincing narrative. In fact, what is 
striking is the simplicity and directness of the message that comes across 
from the painstaking research by the scholarly community that, over the 
years, have questioned the proposition about the necessity of bombing this 
city as a means to end the war.
Be that as it may, we note that the third perspective on what happened 
here in Hiroshima in 1945 (or seventy-three years ago) is hardly audible 
in public discourse. In fact, the first perspective—on the atomic bombing 
as a necessary evil—remains the dominant view because it remains 
preponderant in academia as well as in public history, particularly in the 
United States. Indeed, public history is the arena through which historical 
knowledge can reach the public. Because understandably scholars write 
for an academic audience, public history has emerged to communicate the 
findings of scholarly research and to share them meaningfully, that is, in a 
way that makes sense to the public at large. However, public history is far 
from monolithic: some views are dominant, while others are marginalized. 
Public history is a site of discursive struggle.
The Marcos Papers
When it comes to the Marcos dictatorship, we have to admit that few of us 
in the Philippine social science community (myself included) have been 
concerned about its historiography. Few of us have bothered to unravel the 
regime’s inner workings, despite the lifting of the repressive atmosphere 
under Marcos’s reign and the availability of sources since the strongman’s 
downfall.
Into the hands of the Philippine Commission for Good Government 
(PCGG) fell for safekeeping the volumes of papers that were left behind 
in Malacañang after the Marcoses fled the country in 1986. Initially the 
Marcos Papers were used to try to recover the dictator’s ill-gotten wealth and 
thus were indexed by the PCGG for legal purposes. The National Historical 
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), which has joint custodianship 
of these papers, is responsible for cataloging them as historical materials. 
However, nearly twenty-eight years passed before a definite move was taken 
to organize the Marcos Papers and make them accessible to researchers. 
In late 2014 until mid-2015, historian Meynardo Mendoza undertook the 
task of selecting approximately 600,000 documents from the mass of papers 
for digitization, as researchers can only access the digitized copies rather 
than the original documents that are kept in a high-security vault. At the 
moment, the NHCP has catalogued only about 30 percent of these Marcos 
Papers.
Given the relative recency of researchers’ access to the Marcos Papers, 
I know of only one journal article, published in the June 2018 issue of 
Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints, that has utilized 
them to unearth some aspects of Marcos’s rule. The article by Miguel Paolo 
Reyes, research associate at the University of the Philippines’s (UP) Third 
World Studies Center, titled “Producing Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Scholarly 
Author,” was originally presented at the conference, “The Remains of a 
Dictatorship,” which this journal organized in August 2017 precisely to 
generate papers on the Marcos dictatorship.
It is widely known that Tadhana: The History of the Filipino People, the 
hefty two-volume series on Philippine history published under the name of 
Ferdinand Marcos as author, was actually written by a group of professional 
historians led by Serafin Quiason Jr. and Samuel K. Tan (Churchill 2018). 
But no one had inquired about the authorship of other Marcos books that 
came out during his reign until Reyes (2018) utilized the methods of book 
history to demonstrate that thirteen books supposedly authored by Marcos 
were in fact written by minions, particularly Adrian Cristobal, who played 
key roles in constructing the fiction of a scholar-president. The first and 
most crucial among these books published in 1971, Today’s Revolution: 
Democracy, according to Reyes (ibid., 184–85), was beset by plagiarism 
and factual errors. In 1973 Notes on the New Society of the Philippines 
came out. In his memo to the president dated 27 February 1973, Cristobal 
emphasized that Notes on the New Society would show “that the President 
considered every possible alternative before taking the momentous decision 
of 22 September 1972” (ibid., 187) to declare martial law—note: 22, not 21 
September, which would explain the announcement of martial law in the 
early evening of 23 September. More Marcos books came out from 1974 to 
1985, largely based on materials recycled from books previously published 
under Marcos’s name. According to Reyes (ibid., 203), “Cristobal gave 
Marcos a recyclable text that justified Marcos’s continued rule.” 
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Significantly, Reyes reveals Marcos’s diary entry of 8 October 1970: “I 
often wonder what I will be remembered in history for.” Beside it he scribbled 
his own answer, providing a list of possibilities: “Scholar? Military hero? 
Builder? . . . Strong rallying point, or a weak tyrant?” (ibid., 209; Rempel 
1993, xiii). Interestingly, his first thought was the halo of a scholar. That 
Marcos breached norms of intellectual honesty is not surprising; the bigger 
question is why he desired the reputation of a scholar—yes, the reputation 
that you and I are working hard to establish. Although it is easy to speculate 
about it, Marcos’s scholarly dream remains an enigma in relation to his 
dictatorship.
The only other study by an academic that I am aware of that used the 
Marcos Papers is the important monograph of political scientist Belinda 
Aquino (1987) titled Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos 
published by the UP College of Public Administration. The study reveals the 
extent to which the Marcoses “plundered” the country, providing details on 
its “dynamics” such as the creation of state monopolies for cronies, offshore 
business operations, diversion and misappropriation of foreign aid and loans, 
the direct raiding of state financial operations, as well as corruption within 
the military. The size of the plunder was estimated to be between US$5 and 
$10 billion. As then Dean of the College of Public Administration Gabriel U. 
Iglesias put it, the extent of this greed “is a world record, and mind-boggling, 
to say the least” (ibid., iii).
Beyond the gargantuan thievery, there are many more questions about 
the Marcos state that await answers, such as: Why did Marcos declare 
martial law? In what ways did personal factors on Marcos’s part interact with 
structural factors, including the armed communist and Moro secessionist 
movements, eventuating in authoritarian rule? How did Marcos prepare, 
structure, and coordinate a state system—with a multiplicity of offices and 
institutions—that enabled him to deploy the power of one-man rule across 
a variegated archipelago? How did Marcos share power with what in effect 
was a ruling coalition or an authoritarian elite in a manner that consolidated 
his rule? What were the different elements and levels of engagement in his 
ruling coalition, and how did these different elements relate to each other 
and to him? Think of the military, the technocrats, the regional warlords, the 
sectoral cronies, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) politicians, the high-
ranking bureaucrats, and sundry consultants in the academe who in different 
degrees were part of the ruling elite. Did they regard Marcos as a “rallying 
point”? How did Marcos create the impression of a unified state despite the 
absence of homogeneity and uniformity within governmental organizations 
and in the society at large? How did Marcos transition from the use of crude 
coercive mechanisms to something less coercive and more hegemonic? Why 
was there a need for a semblance of elections for a rubber-stamp parliament 
in 1984? How did Marcos manufacture consent from different sectors of 
society? To what extent did he intentionally deploy nationalist rhetoric as 
a legitimation strategy for his regime? What authoritarian “toolkits” did 
Marcos utilize to preempt and deal with domestic as well as international 
threats? What were the sources of weakness—including but going beyond his 
personal health—that unraveled Marcos’s authoritarian regime? What roles 
did the US play in the establishment, maintenance, and dissolution of the 
Marcos dictatorship? These and many more questions can be raised about 
Marcos’s rule—not to mention its comparative aspects with, say, Suharto’s 
rule in New Order Indonesia. Given the monumental nature of this project, 
we need not work alone; in fact, there is great room for collaboration with 
colleagues within and across disciplines. It can be our common project.
In any event, Reyes and Aquino have demonstrated the possibilities of 
utilizing the Marcos Papers for research purposes. Undoubtedly, so much 
valuable information is waiting to be uncovered in this collection of state 
and personal papers, which we hope can provide answers to questions 
about the Marcos dictatorship. Even if some of the most sensitive and 
incriminating documents might have been personally brought by the 
Marcoses with them as they fled the country and are therefore no longer part 
of the Marcos Papers, it would still be possible to see through the “cracks in 
the parchment curtain,” as William Henry Scott (1982) asserted in relation 
to Spanish colonial documents. In fact, we may already suspect or know 
intuitively many aspects of Marcos’s martial law regime; and although we 
are fully cognizant of its effects and consequences, it is another thing to 
enter the secret chamber, so to speak, and find the evidence, especially 
evidence of the incontrovertible kind. We should not underestimate what 
new historiography can arise from the painstaking work of sifting through 
those papers. 
The Surprise of “Revisionism”
The task of uncovering the Marcos state, of writing its ethnography, has 
stalled since the works that came out soon after the strongman’s fall. It has 
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taken thirty-two years since Marcos was booted out of power for a study to 
see print that proved, for instance, that the Marcos state engaged in the 
deliberate manufacture of the ruler’s image. In fact, since 1986 collectively 
we as a people decided to move on, with the country never having had 
something like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 
was established in 1996. 
After Marcos died in Hawaii in 1989, we became even more complacent. 
Two years later members of his family began to return to the Philippines. In 
1992 Imelda Marcos ran for the presidency and lost; however, Ferdinand 
“Bongbong” Marcos Jr. was elected representative of the second district of 
Ilocos Norte. In 1995 Marcos Jr. ran for the senate and lost, while Imelda 
was elected representative of her home province of Leyte. It seemed that 
the Marcoses were a spent force, certainly at the national level. Support for 
the Marcoses in their home provinces was dismissed as understandable and 
largely confined to those places. In 1993 Pres. Fidel Ramos lifted the ban on 
the return to the Philippines of the dictator’s remains; while objecting to a 
state burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ramos allowed the remains to 
be flown to Ilocos Norte. 
Fifteen years after the failure of his initial attempt to become senator, 
Bongbong Marcos was elected senator, having campaigned on a platform 
as a progressive politician with a track record as governor of Ilocos Norte 
since 1998, while denying his parents ever committed crimes during the 
dictatorship. Indeed, by 2010—or twenty-four years after his downfall—the 
dictator’s survivors were again well placed in the country’s political system. 
In that year, Imee replaced Bongbong as Ilocos Norte governor, while 
Imelda was elected congresswoman of her husband’s province. When we 
look back, we discern a pattern of an apparently well-crafted long-range plan 
of the Marcoses (after their national-level failures in 1992–1995) to retake 
Malacañang through the traditional route of reentering politics at the local 
level in a stepwise progression to national politics.
While they planned, we looked the other way. We barely noticed that 
textbooks used in elementary schools had continued to glorify Marcos 
and his protracted presidency, extolling the merits of martial law and the 
New Society. Our peripheral vision did not perceive that there were many 
schoolteachers and even some of our university colleagues who genuinely 
looked back with nostalgia to the Marcos regime. We were caught unawares 
that Marcos had created and recreated a followership, until finally we 
were jolted about the very real possibility that a Marcos would return to 
Malacañang when the 2016 elections brought Bongbong within a stone’s 
throw of vice presidential power. 
In 2013 UP’s Third World Studies Center held a series of public forums, 
publishing the thick proceedings in Kasarinlan under the title “Marcos Pa 
Rin! Ang Mga Pamana at Sumpa ng Rehimeng Marcos” (Marcos Ever More! 
The Legacies and Curse of the Marcos Regime). This concerted effort to 
revisit the Marcos dictatorship was precipitated by the jolt that came not 
from the electoral victory of a Marcos but from the renaming of the College 
of Business Administration to the Cesar E. A. Virata School of Business 
(Virata, among other designations, was Marcos’s finance minister from 1970 
to 1986),” which brought home the realization that “the years of the Marcos 
dictatorship were either being forgotten or deliberately sanitized” (Reyes 
and Jose 2012–2013, 7). Despite some academic publications on Marcos 
and martial law before 2016, it was only with the son’s foreseeable electoral 
victory and Pres. Rodrigo Duterte’s decision to bury Marcos’s remains at 
the Libingan ng mga Bayani that it really dawned upon us as an epistemic 
community that the past was coming back with a vengeance. Surprised, 
only then did we in academia exclaim, almost (but definitely not) in unison, 
“Historical revisionism!”
And yet, in one of those fora organized by the Third World Studies Center 
in 2013, political scientist Amado Mendoza (2012–2013, 128) explained: 
“The reason why the Marcoses do not need rehabilitation is because we 
failed. We failed to precisely revise history. Those of us who went through 
the struggle against the dictatorship, we failed. We did not reach out far 
enough so that this image of history could be changed.” Historian Ferdinand 
Llanes (2012–2013) also spoke in the same forum, stating that revisionism 
per se is legitimate if it is the product of new evidence or new techniques of 
understanding what happened in the past. Llanes (ibid., 130) observed that 
the Marcos camp was involved in propagating a “narrative of denial,” and 
yet he also observed, like Mendoza, that the “prevailing or dominant view of 
martial law” had no need of revising because from textbooks to social media 
martial law was spoken of in positive terms.
In 1986, everything seemed very clear to us. In our euphoria, we 
forgot that some cried when Marcos fell from power. We never imagined 
that the vanquished would reassert their own narrative. Thus, the historical 
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revisionism we now decry owes to our collective failure to revise and rewrite 
history after Marcos’s downfall.
Academic Studies of the Marcos State
I am not saying that there had been no scholarly studies of Marcos’s rule 
and the Marcos family’s excesses—not to mention the nonacademic writings 
and personal testimonies, such as Primitivo Mijares’s (1976) The Conjugal 
Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. We should also recall Ricardo 
Manapat’s (1991) Some are Smarter than Others: The History of Marcos’ 
Crony Capitalism, which first circulated as a forty-page pamphlet in 1979. 
For obvious reasons, there was hardly any study on Marcos’s rule 
published in the Philippines for the greater part of the Marcos dictatorship. 
Undoubtedly exceptional is lawyer-sociologist Perla Makil’s “Mobility by 
Decree: The Rise and Fall of Philippine Influentials since Martial Law,” 
a research report put out by the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), 
Ateneo de Manila University, in 1975, the height of Marcosian hegemony. 
With limited circulation and simply mimeographed, this research report 
that compares 1969 and 1975 data is strictly not about the Marcos state; 
it provides social science data showing that, expectedly, influence became 
concentrated in a few people after the declaration of martial law; however, 
it offers the interesting information that a strong military presence was not 
discernible in 1975, seemingly lending “support to the government’s claim 
that there is no military rule, in spite of the imposition of martial law” (Makil 
1975, 57–58). This finding is important for regime legitimation and needs to 
be revisited to understand the early phase of the dictatorship, to a time before 
retired military officers were recycled into civilian government officials.
In 1976, under the leadership of Francisco Nemenzo Jr., the UP 
College of Arts and Sciences established Third World Studies, which, 
according to political scientist Patricio Abinales’s (2010, xiii) cogent history 
of the center, “was designed to gradually reinsert radical thinking into a 
severely traumatized university.” To escape the regime’s surveillance, 
the Third World Studies avoided words like “Marxism” and revolution” 
and instead utilized dependency and world–systems theories to critique 
the regime. In the late 1970s it put out papers critical of transnational 
corporations, export agriculture, and the Philippine “mode of production.” 
These Third World Studies papers tried to critique the Marcos state but did 
not directly challenge it by seeking cover in theoretical language. In the late 
1970s other entities, such as the IPC, also produced studies on rural poverty 
and landlessness, but, if anything, they were mute critiques of the Marcos 
regime—and often overwhelmed by studies in the modernization school.
One of the earliest edited collections on the Philippines under Marcos 
was published by Cornell University Press in 1979 titled, Marcos and 
Martial Law in the Philippines, edited by David Rosenberg. Several years 
passed without any major scholarly publication on the regime, except the 
1982 Occasional Paper No. 5 of the Philippine Studies Program of the 
University of Hawai‘i titled “Cronies and Enemies: The Current Philippine 
Scene” (Aquino 1982), with a contribution by Fr. John F. Doherty, SJ, on 
interlocking directorates that showed the Marcoses at the pinnacle (cf. 
Doherty [1979]).
Only after the evident weakness of the Marcos state after the assassination 
of former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. in 1983 did several studies 
emerge and get published in the Philippines. In 1984 the UP Press published 
the multidisciplinary collection of papers presented at a UP colloquium under 
the title Nation in Crisis: The University Inquires into the Present, edited by 
Alexander R. Magno (1984). In the same year, the Psychological Association 
of the Philippines compiled the papers presented in its annual convention 
under the title “Our Nation in Crisis: A Psychological Perspective” (Bernas 
and Lolarga 1984). The Filipino scholarly community was beginning to 
offer various levels and types of analysis to understand the palpable crisis.
In 1985, R. J. May and Nemenzo edited a collection of papers expectantly 
titled The Philippines after Marcos, printed in Britain by Croom Helm 
but with seven out of the thirteen chapters contributed by Australia-based 
academics. Five chapters were written by Filipinos, but Nemenzo at that 
time was on leave from UP and was affiliated with the Australian National 
University. Soon after Marcos’s downfall, the Asia Society assembled nine 
papers, four of them written by Filipinos; these papers were published in 
1986 by Princeton University Press under the title Crisis in the Philippines: 
The Marcos Era and Beyond, edited by John Bresnan. Published overseas, 
these edited volumes were motivated by the need to understand and explain 
events in the Philippines to Western audiences. In 1987 came Gary Hawes’s 
full-length study, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics 
of Export, published by Cornell University Press. 
Once Marcos had fallen from power, the academic community in 
the Philippines would appear not to have felt much of a need to analyze 
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the defunct regime and explain it to Filipinos. In 1987, one full-length study 
on the declaration of martial law, which was largely conceptual rather than 
historiographic, appeared: Alex Brillantes’s Dictatorship and Martial Law: 
Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972, based on his PhD dissertation at the 
University of Hawai‘i. In 1988 Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s 
Power was published, edited by Aurora Javier-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, 
and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol. The six contributors to Dictatorship and Revolution 
analyzed the rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, with more than half 
of this thick volume devoted to the reproduction of documents as primary 
sources. Beyond these works that appeared in the late 1980s, nothing much was 
published in the Philippines on the Marcos state and the martial law regime.
In the 1990s there were initiatives to understand the events in retrospect. 
The effects of Marcos’s rule and his downfall were studied at the local level by 
twelve contributors to the volume From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives 
on Political Transition in the Philippines, edited by Benedict Kerkvliet and 
Resil Mojares and copublished by the University of Hawai‘i Press and the 
Ateneo de Manila University Press in 1991. Of the twelve contributors, only 
four were Filipinos. In 1993 James Boyce’s The Political Economy of Growth 
and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era was published by the University of 
Hawai‘i Press. 
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of academic 
works that seek to understand the Marcos dictatorship and the intricacies of 
his complex rule. Among the studies that directly deal with the nature and 
dynamics of the regime, what stands out is the preponderance of Western 
scholarship, along with a few works by scholars from the Philippines, some of 
them while they were based overseas. Filipino academics seemed exhausted 
by the struggle to survive the dictatorship, with most of us not having had 
the energy and even the interest to study Marcos’s rule systematically. It was 
as though we as an epistemic community shared in the collective trauma 
of all those who fought and resisted the dictatorship, and it was best not to 
reopen the wounds because, deep down, the scars were still fresh. For some 
of us, anger at the dictator, his family, and associates had made it difficult 
to take an academic stance of inquiry toward the dictatorship. Even after 
his downfall many of us continued to “demonize” the regime in a way that 
made it tough for us to assume a position of scholarly engagement. For many 
reasons then, we did not study the dictatorship whose collapse we celebrated 
and, in our minds, consigned to the past, buried and never to be awakened.
Many of us poured our energies in confronting the challenges of the new 
administration and the new administration after that and the one after that—
in a word, so preoccupied were we with the present in which we lived that 
we did not investigate and study the Marcos state that had collapsed. Perhaps 
we were just like the ancients of the region that today we call Southeast Asia 
who were distinguished for their presentmindedness, largely fueled by the 
“structural amnesia” built into the cognatic kinship system that also affected 
leadership and the dynamics of ancient polities, mandalas as Oliver Wolters 
(1982) called them. It is a good reason for structured forgetting. 
Lately, for the work of remembering, we have been supplied with 
the memoirs of both those who served in the regime (e.g., Enrile 2012) 
and those who fought and opposed it (e.g., Quimpo and Quimpo 2012). 
Although these recollections are important for “authenticating the self,” 
as Mary Grace Concepcion (2018) has recently argued in reference to the 
autobiographies of survivors of martial law, they cannot replace the hard 
work of research.
The corollary of our collective shying away from studying the Marcos 
state was the inability of whatever scholarly knowledge there was to seep 
into public discourse and to shape public history. In June 2016, soon after 
the national elections, historian Lisandro Claudio wrote a piece in Rappler 
titled “What you didn’t know: Pro-Marcos propaganda too hip for its own 
good.” Claudio (2016) was engaged in a debate with a Marcos supporter:
I first asked him if he could name a single university-published, 
peer-reviewed book that endorses the Marcos regime, and got a non 
sequitur for a reply. I prodded further, asking, “So, no book?” to which 
he simply replied, “Nope.”
Failing to spur dialogue, I asked him for his sources on Philippine politics 
during the Marcos period. He remained dismissive: “What I read in my 
own time is my business. What I publish via GetRealPhilippines.com is 
all u got.” As for bothering with academic sources, Benign0 believes 
that “Ph history academe is a tiny community of inbred minds.”
In the end Claudio recommended a short list of published works by 
foreign authors in order that he would not be “accused of forwarding the 
biases of local professors . . . (though I will insist that local academics are 
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just as qualified).” But, really, one would have to search high and low to find 
a peer-reviewed journal article by a local academic on the Marcos regime. 
The attempt to provide this Marcos loyalist and the rest of the reading 
public a short reading list is indicative of our epistemic community’s inability 
to influence public discourse on the Marcos regime and the public history 
of the Marcos period. When Nation in Crisis appeared in 1984, a review 
by Abinales (1985, 41) optimistically stated that “the University’s role as an 
institution of ideas relating itself to society has been effectively fulfilled.” 
I do not wish to be unjust to Abinales and Claudio. It is because I am 
confident that they will not misunderstand me that I can cite them to make 
the argument that the scholarly analyses contained in the few studies on the 
Marcos dictatorship published by our colleagues have remained ensconced 
within academia, largely inaccessible to those who do not rely on us for 
passing grades.
Social Scientists and Public Discourse
To understand our lack of influence on public discourse, we need to 
examine the institutional and personal contexts in which we pursue social 
science research and publication and the wider societal context that affects 
the receptivity to what we have to say.
A first and major factor for our lack of influence on public discourse is 
our general inability or lack of interest in writing textbooks. In the Western 
context, it is easy to point to the prestige and reward structure in universities 
that generally do not encourage textbook writing. But this is not the case in 
the Philippines where textbook authors acquire popularity and reap huge 
financial rewards. Still, many of us who conduct research and publish our 
studies are generally averse to writing textbooks for the tertiary but especially 
for the secondary level. Our collective hesitation to engage in textbook 
writing—a generalization from which Abinales and Claudio are in fact 
exempt for they have written college-level textbooks—is rather universal 
and applies across various subject and topical areas. Moreover, even when 
university-based academics are requested to review secondary-level textbook 
manuscripts prior to publication, the impact on the quality of high school 
textbooks is evidently negligible (cf. Aguilar 2017).
At the same time, textbook production is the outcome of a host of 
intersecting and even competing factors: the education department’s 
guidelines, the publisher’s considerations, the author’s preferences and 
limitations, and even members of textbook boards as well as the teachers 
who use these textbooks. Rommel Curaming (2017) has shown the resulting 
political incoherence in his study of fifteen secondary history textbooks 
published in the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, even after the collapse 
of the Marcos state, high school textbook authors have had their way and 
have persisted in presenting a favorable and approving image of Marcos’s 
presidency and martial law regime.
When it comes to college-level history textbooks, the silence on martial 
law is revealing if we take the case of what is probably the most widely used 
textbook, Teodoro A. Agoncillo’s History of the Filipino People. Originally 
produced in mimeographed form in 1960, this textbook has continued 
to be reissued even after the author’s death in 1985. As Vernon Totanes 
(2010, 319) explains in an article published in Philippine Studies, “no other 
comparable work has sold as many copies.” Totanes explains the fate of one 
chapter titled “The Continuing Crisis,” which Agoncillo added in 1967. 
“Although the new chapter began with the presidential election of 1961, 
most of it . . . was devoted to a series of crises involving Marcos’s contentious 
path to the presidency, the rise of student activism, the deterioration of peace 
and order, and a ‘witch-hunt’ that occurred toward the end of 1966” (ibid., 
331). After Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the Mass Media Council 
instructed Agoncillo to “delete or rewrite objectionable portions.” As 
Totanes (ibid., 332) reveals, however, the “reviewers were more concerned 
about passages involving the military, intelligence agencies, Congress, and 
anticommunists, not Marcos himself.” In fact, Agoncillo was on friendly 
terms with the autocrat. But Agoncillo did not make the required revisions 
because this chapter had been appended to the textbook version of which 
Oscar M. Alfonso had been his coauthor. Because of a personal quarrel 
with Alfonso whom he regarded as a “slimy traitor and skunk” (ibid., 334), 
Agoncillo gladly allowed this version to be disallowed publication because 
he had an alternative: a textbook coauthored with Milagros C. Guerrero, 
without the chapter on “The Continuing Crisis.” As Totanes (ibid., 336) 
concludes, “Agoncillo’s voluntary deletion of an entire chapter illustrates 
how the content and publication of history books can be shaped by political 
realities, as well as personal relationships, and that the authors involved do 
not necessarily view censorship negatively.” Alas, for base reasons, a popular 
textbook has remained silent about Marcos’s contentious rise to power.
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Secondly, the import of academic research on Marcos’s ill-gotten wealth, 
especially Aquino’s pioneering study in 1987, has been vitiated by the lack 
of “validation” by the Philippine justice system. The PCGG is still pursuing 
about 280 pending cases that seek to recover what Marcos, his family, and 
their cronies plundered from the Philippine state. The Supreme Court is 
still supposed to be hearing cases to recover this wealth. In only three cases 
has the high court issued a ruling that forfeits funds and assets in favor of the 
Philippine government.
In the first decision, dated 15 July 2003, the Supreme Court en banc 
forfeited in favor of the Philippine government Swiss deposits amounting 
to a total of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest. The 
second ruling, issued by the Second Division on 25 April 2012, forfeited in 
favor of the government US$3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all interests and other 
accrued income, from all assets, properties, and funds belonging to Arelma, 
S.A., a Panamanian entity maintaining an account in Merrill Lynch, New 
York. The third ruling is a resolution of the Supreme Court First Division 
issued on 18 January 2017 forfeiting in favor of the government pieces of 
jewelry known as the Malacañang Collection that were seized soon after the 
Marcoses fled to Hawaii. As can be observed, only the first ruling involves 
the comparatively large amount of US$658 million. The overall status of 
the Marcos family’s wealth has not been adjudicated. Imelda is said to have 
quipped, “Wala pa naman akong kaso talaga na natalo” (I have not really 
lost a single case) (Llanes 2012–2013, 134). The justice system by default 
has provided the Marcoses and their supporters with a plausible argument 
that the charges of corruption against them have little factual and legal bases. 
On 9 November 2018, after I had written this portion of the paper, came 
the news that the Sandiganbayan had convicted Imelda Marcos, now 89 
years old, of seven counts of graft amounting to US$200 million based on 
their Swiss accounts. These cases had been pending with the anti-graft court 
for twenty-seven years. Because of the highly polarized situation at present, 
this decision was cheered and held up us as the “evidence” that Marcos 
loyalists were saying did not exist—earlier convictions did not receive this 
warm reception—yet, it is too early to tell what its impact will be.
A third reason for the lack of traction of academic perspectives on 
the Marcos regime is the perceived absence of any major impact of the 
downfall of Marcos and the restoration of “elite democracy” on ordinary 
people’s lives since 1986. In other words, nothing has changed or, as they 
say, walang pagbabago. One can argue that getting rid of a dictator was no 
mean feat—even if many from our ranks have emphasized that the end 
of the Marcos dictatorship merely reintroduced the ancien régime prior 
to martial law (Nemenzo 1988; Anderson 1988). People Power in 1986 
understandably raised expectations about the clean-up of the government. 
But for today’s ordinary citizens there has been a seamless continuity of 
corruption from the past to the present. In other words, if the Marcos state 
was corrupt, as the anti–Marcos narrative asserts, the period that followed 
his fall from power did not experience a diminution in corruption. More 
than anything else—such as Walden Bello’s (2018, 79–80) stress on elite 
democracy, the concentration of wealth, neoliberal economic policies, and 
foreign debt repayments—for ordinary people the persistence of corruption 
seals the failure of what Nicole Curato (2017, 11–12) has called the “EDSA 
system,” an important factor in the rise of Duterte to power.
The delegitimizing effect of the persistence of corruption is supported 
by a study made by psychologists James Liu of Victoria University of 
Wellington and Cecilia Conaco of UP Diliman. Liu and Conaco (2011) 
present three studies on the impact of social representations of EDSA People 
Power that were conducted in three different time periods. Executed in 
1998, the first study asked 302 students from four different state universities 
located in Metro Manila, Nueva Ecija, Cebu, and Lanao del Sur about 
what they considered the “most important events in Philippine history”; 
the overwhelming response was the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, 
which the authors underscored had acquired “charter status” (ibid., 176). 
The second and third studies investigated the impact of this watershed event 
on participation in the ouster of Joseph Estrada and in the willingness to 
participate in the ouster of Gloria Arroyo. The second study was conducted 
in Metro Manila in 2001 and the third study in 2004. Liu and Conaco (ibid., 
187) found that, contrary to expectation, “a measure of belief in the ‘People 
Power’ of EDSA I was not an independent predictor of either participation or 
participation intentions in social protest movements. Rather, it was a measure 
of historical fatalism, or belief that EDSA and similar social movements are 
an ineffective means of reducing corruption in government.” The youth had 
developed “passivity in the face of the frequent abuses of power by elites in 
the Filipino political system,” an attitude that was “anchored in historical 
fatalism about the ability of the people to produce genuine change” (ibid.). 
Given the persistence of corruption, amid the apparent circulation of elites, 
EDSA People Power has lost its “charter status.”
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Faced with these historical realities, younger Marcos loyalists can ask: 
if the present is bad, can the past be any worse? Any criticism of the Marcos 
regime as corrupt would get the retort: So, how different was the past from 
what is going on now? In fact, the retort of Marcos loyalists asserts that the 
present is bad, but the past under Marcos was good and great.
History According to Social Media
Indeed, a major reason for why scholarship on the Marcos regime has failed 
to influence public discourse is the absence of an overall narrative structure 
from the time Marcos was in power until his downfall and the present period, 
one that is convincing especially to those inclined or who actually support 
and look back with nostalgia to the Marcos years. We have not produced a 
perspective on the Marcos state and its dynamics of power that, from an emic 
standpoint, makes sense to the people who support or are inclined to support 
Marcos’s rule. In other words, we need a “history from below”—but one not 
defined by class, as in the late nineteenth century, if we are to follow historian 
Reynaldo Ileto’s (1979) argument in Pasyon and Revolution, because today 
support for Marcos transcends class and even Ilocano ethnicity. In exact 
contrast, the Marcos camp has produced a narrative emplotment that, as 
far as those who adhere to it are concerned, seems impervious to criticisms. 
Against this metanarrative, our arguments sound like petty quibbling over 
insignificant details.
Marcos loyalists have disseminated their narrative through social media 
and, before the advent of social media, they used whatever technologies 
were available, in their effort to reach members of the younger generation 
who have no personal experience or memory of the Marcos regime. In 2013 
Llanes (2012–2013, 131–34) called attention to the content of three videos 
on YouTube that extolled Marcos’s supposedly incomparable leadership; 
the achievements of martial law; the illogicality of Marcos ordering Ninoy 
Aquino’s assassination because they were said to be friends (it is true that 
Aquino, instead of being killed, was allowed to seek medical treatment in the 
US in 1980, where he lived until he decided to return to the Philippines in 
1983); Imelda’s explanation of the family’s wealth as due to Marcos’s acumen 
in trading gold; and Bongbong’s dismissal of accusations against him and his 
father as mere political propaganda.
Recently a systematic study of Marcosian social media has been 
published by literary and cultural studies expert Victor Felipe Bautista 
(2018) in the September 2018 issue of Philippine Studies: Historical 
and Ethnographic Viewpoints. Bautista looks at three sources: Blogger 
Mr. Riyoh’s “Real Talk about MARCOS,” Baron Buchokoy or 
PinoyMonkeyPride’s “NINOY + PEOPLE POWER: Hidden Truths The 
MEDIA Is NOT Telling Us,” and an article posted on the KBL website 
titled “The Untold Story of the Kingdom of Maharlikans, now called 
The Philippines,” written by a so-called “Royal Maharlikans Priesthood.” 
(Marcos’s guerilla organization during the Second World War was supposedly 
called “Ang Mga Maharlika.”)
Bautista unravels the narrative structure of the Marcos loyalist’s version 
of history, which they understand in terms of (a) the “glorious past” under 
a benevolent President Marcos, (b) “the Fall” supposedly orchestrated by 
Corazon “Cory” Aquino in a Dilawan (Yellow) conspiracy, and (c) the 
“dark” present, when Marcos is said to be a “victim of black propaganda.” 
This narrative structure—of the possession, loss, and reclamation of the once 
Great Nation, also known as New Society or Bagong Lipunan—is uncannily 
similar to the standard linear emplotment of nationalist history, a parallelism 
that gives it a ring of truth. This perspective views Marcos as the father who 
truly loved the country and built the New Society. However, Cory is deemed 
as the evil Other—the m(Other)—who was the exact opposite of Marcos 
in terms of gender, intelligence, acumen, and heart, supposedly lacking 
everything that Marcos possessed and stood for. This other Mother, says 
Bautista, conspired to usurp the Father’s power, robbing Marcos devotees of 
joy and excitement and depriving the nation of Marcos’s greatness, resulting 
in the people’s ignorance and poverty and in societal decline. Marcos loyalists 
thus seek the reimposition of martial law to retrieve what they believed was 
once the Great Nation/New Society.
This fantasy is culturally credible because presidents are imagined in 
terms of kinship relationships. It is not surprising to conceive of Marcos as 
father, just as at present Duterte is called Tatay Digong by his supporters—
even though the former was a more “intellectual” father compared with 
the “kanto-boy” (gadabout) fatherhood of the latter (which, to be fair, is 
the more familiar experience in many families). Moreover, although it is 
fantastical in its overall vision and interpretation, the Marcosian version 
of history has a powerful narrative structure because it parallels nationalist 
history—suggestive of how easily nationalist history can be misappropriated 
to serve other ends. Moreover, there are pieces of evidence that can be 
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made to fit the overall story of the Marcosian fantasy; in other words, it can 
marshal its own empirical evidence in the mold of standard historiography. 
This social fantasy subsumes empirically proven historical facts to give it 
credibility. A favorite proof of a lost greatness are the edifices that Marcos 
built, which continue to be used until today. After all, who will deny the 
continuing social usefulness of, say, the Heart Center, the Lung Center, and 
the Cultural Center of the Philippines? Moreover, at least during the early 
years of martial law until the oil shock of the late 1970s and until the rapacity 
of crony capitalism became apparent, the Marcos state had a developmental 
angle and the Philippines had highly unequal but respectable growth, as 
some economists have argued (Jayasuriya and Hill 1985; Villegas 1986). If 
anything, we need to arrive at a proper periodization of Marcos’s rule as well 
as a deeper analysis of the tensions between plunder and cronyism, on one 
hand, and technocracy and developmentalism, on the other (Hau 2016).
Indeed, if we are to be truthful, the Marcos dictatorship was not solidly 
black and dismal, because as in any historical period it had some grey areas. 
We should note that a simplistic history may attract converts, but it also 
generates its own backlash. A more impartial assessment would remind us, 
for instance, that in 1975, following the move of the US under Nixon and 
Kissinger, the Philippines opened diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic 
of China. As a preparatory gesture, Marcos granted Philippine citizenship 
to resident Chinese through mass naturalization: instead of the usually 
expensive and slow judicial procedure, Chinese as well as other legally 
classified aliens were naturalized through an expeditious administrative 
procedure by presidential decree (Aguilar 2012). We cannot begrudge the 
Chinese, South Asians, and other nationals for feeling grateful to Marcos 
for this dictator’s largesse. Since the 1960s, Philippine Chinese leaders we 
now call Tsinoys had campaigned for acceptance and inclusion in the body 
politic, but to no avail. In 1975, however, an authoritarian ruler ironically 
provided ethnic minorities a democratic right through access to Philippine 
citizenship. A recognition of the dictator’s legacy has come in the form of 
Republic Act 9139, known as the Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000 
and approved on 8 June 2001, which codifies and updates the administrative 
procedure for naturalization made possible by Marcos’s edict in the mid-
1970s. Thus, administrative naturalization is now an established procedure, 
serving as the means by which aliens and stateless persons born on Philippine 
territory can obtain Philippine citizenship.
Human Rights of the Pasaway?
At present, most criticisms of the Marcos regime emphasize human rights 
violations—a fact recognized by Republic Act 10368, the Human Rights 
Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013 (interestingly passed 
when Juan Ponce Enrile was president of the Senate). However, the fact 
that there were human rights violations during Marcos’s reign can be 
dismissed rather easily in the Marcosian version of history: the social fantasy 
of Marcos loyalists asserts that, as father of the nation, Marcos had the right 
to scold and discipline errant children; he was justified in punishing the 
“troublemakers” (pasaway), whose condition the loyalists contrast with the 
“obedient children,” the “law-abiding citizens” who in their view reaped 
“the full benefits of the dictatorship” (Bautista 2018, 282). State-as-family 
discipline is completely justified in this way of thinking.
The intransigence of this mentality is evinced in the recently passed 
psychology Master’s thesis of Ryan Angelo P. Camacho (2018), who studied 
Duterte’s speeches and his supporters’ statements posted on Facebook 
concerning the administration’s so-called war on drugs. Camacho (ibid., 13) 
deployed corpus analysis of 347 paragraphs consisting of 18,968 words from 
the president and 302 comments containing 21,763 words posted by Duterte 
supporters on Facebook. Camacho (ibid., 23) observes that through his 
utterances the president “assigns to himself the duty to protect the youth from 
the drug entity” who are “harming the youth and are stripped of their right 
to live.” In other words, the evil that overcomes another evil becomes a good 
and even a duty to be performed. Besides, the president had declared that the 
supposed “four million” drug addicts are “slaves of drug lords” and “effectively 
stripped of any rights enjoyed by a free individual”; drug addicts have been 
depicted by the president as “lower than the actual victims of modern 
[African] slavery” and therefore “useless” without any “semblance of worth,” 
“further compounded by the drug user’s being positioned as biologically and 
irreversibly insane” and “no longer viable for rehabilitation” (ibid., 25). This 
othering does not make drug addicts into enemies of the state, but rather as 
generalized enemies of society-qua-family under a Tatay President. 
Although Duterte has depicted drug users as having been killing their 
victims, Camacho (ibid., 26) emphasizes that Duterte “does not directly 
claim that killing the drug users is the best course of action.” Nonetheless, 
the othering of the drug user is so extreme that “the aggressive methods of 
the anti-drug operations becomes positioned as the only remaining option” 
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(ibid.). This conclusion is complemented by the supporters’ point of view 
that “It is best to just kill them on the spot” (ibid., 32), especially in the case 
of so-called drug lords who get away because the justice system has been 
so thoroughly corrupted by “narco-politcians” such that killings become “a 
source of true justice and blessed by a higher power” (ibid., 34).
As a result of this way of thinking, the casualties of the so-called war on 
drugs—the victims of extrajudicial killings (EJKs)—are not to be lamented 
because killing them has acquired a moral justification as a necessary evil. 
This narrative can be directly linked to the Marcos fantasy insofar as the 
supporters of the drug war believe that “LP is the biggest druglord of all” 
because Duterte’s supporters—believing in the charges against Sen. Leila de 
Lima—“position the political opponents of the government as cooperating 
with drug syndicates in the Philippines” (ibid., 28). If the Liberal Party is 
associated with the Aquinos and the Aquinos are associated with EDSA 
People Power, then in the Marcosian social fantasy the conspiracy that 
dethroned the father, Ferdinand Marcos, has further deepened the crisis in 
the country through its alleged alliance with drug syndicates, a conspiracy 
that has supposedly brought forth a narco-state. Hence, all the more there 
is need for a father, Tatay Digong, to rule the Philippines and restore the 
New Society through the declaration of martial law or a revolutionary 
government. In any event, the connectivity of these narrative strands results 
in the facile brushing aside the fate of the pasaway in the past and at present 
as in fact their just deserts.
Our Brand of Authoritarianism
Evidently the interwoven narrative strands of Marcos and Duterte supporters 
exhibit strong elements of authoritarianism. This proposition is supported 
by empirical evidence gathered by psychologist Allan Bernardo (2017) in 
an unpublished study the results of which were presented at a public forum 
held on 29 March 2017. Bernardo and two PhD students at that time, Jose 
Antonio Clemente and Mary Angeline Daganzo, set out to “understand 
the psychological characteristics associated with voters’ choices in the 2016 
Philippine presidential elections.” Soon after the May 2016 elections, they 
posted an online survey targeted at young urban voters (18 to 35 years), a 
group the study describes as a fairly educated sample with high levels of 
information access. There were over 1,160 attempts to answer the online 
survey, but the complete responses of only 545 voters were considered valid; 
hence, this small sample is far from representative. The main voter choices 
were: Miriam Santiago: 230 votes (42.2 percent); Rodrigo Duterte: 156 votes 
(28.62 percent); and Manuel “Mar” Roxas: 123 votes (22.57 percent).
Bernardo and his team found that there are significant differences in 
how Duterte voters (compared with voters of other candidates) perceive 
developments and important issues in Philippines society. They found that 
the “top issues” for Duterte voters were: graft and corruption, 71.2 percent; 
crime, 51.3 percent; and transportation, 51.3 percent. The least important 
issues for Duterte voters were: local insurgency, 3.2 percent; political 
dynasties, 5.1 percent; and human rights, 7.1 percent. As a group, they think 
the country worsened in the six years prior to the 2016 elections. Their social 
beliefs and political values indicate a comparatively stronger belief in the 
justness of the economic system, in the importance of religious practices/
institutions, and in how fate shapes social phenomena. They exhibit a stronger 
endorsement of more conservative political values (traditional morality, law 
and order, blind patriotism, and so on) and weaker endorsement of civil 
liberties. Not surprisingly, the personality characteristics of Duterte voters 
(compared with voters of other candidates) are stronger in social dominance 
orientation and group-based dominance; strong right-wing authoritarianism 
(threat-driven motivation for collective security and social cohesion); and 
lower agreeableness (kind, sympathetic, cooperative, warm, considerate) and 
lower openness to experience (preference for variety, intellectual curiosity). 
Consequently, they are willing to submit to authorities who are perceived 
to be legitimate; they have strong adherence to societal norms and are 
hostile and punitive to those who do not value uniformity; they have lower 
complexity beliefs in how social outcomes are determined; they have lower 
intellectual curiosity, put lower value on civil liberties, and higher value on 
group-based dominance.
The respondents in this online survey, we should note, were born or 
grew up after Marcos’s downfall. What are the sources of the authoritarian 
personality of these young Filipino voters? This is a big question for which 
we have no answer because no study has been undertaken on this subject. 
But we need to understand why we are breeding authoritarian personalities 
right in our midst. We need to look into our families and parenting styles, 
our schools, our religious institutions, our business practices, our mass 
media and information technologies, our formal political processes, the 
huge social inequalities that are often associated with authoritarianism, 
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how we treat our workers, including our kasambahay or household staff, 
how people cope with fear and live with everyday violence, and a host 
of other possible factors that are generative of authoritarianism. How we 
breed our own authoritarian personalities represents a major lacuna in our 
understanding of Philippine society, even as we need to differentiate this 
authoritarianism from what exists in other parts of the world. In fact, we 
should not dismiss it as merely a part of a current worldwide trend, for there 
is evidence of a long-term trend in our country’s brand of authoritarianism. 
We need to understand its specificities in the Philippine context. At the same 
time, we need to understand what nurtures democratic personalities and 
sustains democratic dreams and ideals.
Our Role as Social Scientists
In any event, our role as scholars and social scientists in different spheres 
within and beyond the academe is to accurately and truthfully describe social 
processes and dynamics of power as well as to understand the reasons for their 
existence. To the extent possible, we need to arrive at emic perspectives in 
what can be called “social sciences beyond the divide,” without lapsing into 
either romanticizing or demonizing emic perspectives and concomitantly 
without privileging our own largely etic perspective. In other words, we are 
to deploy the techniques of the social sciences to understand members of 
Philippine society who we may otherwise cast as different from ourselves, 
whose thinking may be diametrically opposed to ours.
One goal that we may claim for ourselves is to bridge the divergent 
sets of understanding of social realities, if only because we as scholars and 
social scientists need to connect with those we seek to understand yet from 
whom our very thinking alienates us. For instance, how do we communicate 
concern for human rights so that it is not brushed aside by association with 
the pasaway? How do we show convincingly that the Marcos loyalists’ version 
of history is contrary to the truth? What language, what genre, and what 
digital technologies should we use? Establishing these connections in a 
way that makes sense to the public is, I think, a political stance in itself, 
but it transcends any partisanship. If there is any lesson to be learned from 
the unhindered spread of the Marcosian social fantasy, it is that we in the 
academe cannot shirk from the social responsibility of influencing social 
discourse, of presenting public history in a way that is meaningful to our de 
facto interlocutors. To the extent that we are able to transcend this chasm, 
this type of engagement, if we can pull it off, will be radically transformative 
of society.
At the same time, as in the dominant narrative of the atomic bomb as 
a necessary evil, the historiography of the Marcos dictatorship and our own 
present time can be altered through the assiduous and painstaking search for 
evidence. Slow and demanding research is unavoidable. Out of our individual 
and collective work, a new narrative will arise. I do not know what this 
alternative storyline will be like, but it will have to be truthful and nuanced. 
There is power in the techniques of our respective academic disciplines that 
can be harnessed to speak truth to power and to sow understanding amid the 
anarchy of interpretations and fantasies. 
In understanding those we deem as others, we understand the 
Philippines and, ultimately, we understand ourselves. 
Note
Keynote address delivered at the Fourth Philippine Studies Conference in Japan, Hiroshima 
University, 17–18 November 2018. I am grateful for the encouraging comments from various 
conference participants and to Carol Hau and Jojo Abinales, who gave feedback on an earlier 
version of this paper. The comments of the referees are gratefully acknowledged. Dios mabalos also 
to Jethro Calacday for assistance in tracking down some sources. I’m truly grateful and proud that 
my 14-year-old son, Isaac, set me off over a year ago to thinking about the debate on Hiroshima’s 
bombing as necessary evil.
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